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Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and then progressing towards the recently signed Treaty of Amsterdam,
the process of European economic unity has produced two stunning results: constant economic growth and
lasting European peace. With the introduction of the euro as legal tender in 2002, the final piece of the EU
puzzle is in place. The new era of the EU is set to begin characterized by increased economic development and
cooperation within the continent.
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The European Union Monetary Integration
Tom Purl
The date is 1 January 1999, and for the first
time in history the nations of Europe will combine their
economic might to form a monetary union of
unparalleled size, diversity, and power.  Starting in
1952 with the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC) and then progressing towards the recently
signed Treaty of Amsterdam, the process of European
economic unity has produced two stunning results:
constant economic growth and lasting European peace.
With the introduction of the euro as legal tender in
2002, the final piece of the EU puzzle is in place.  The
new era of the EU is set to begin characterized by
increased economic development and cooperation
within the continent.
Of course, this is a prediction, one that most
leaders of the EU would probably like the average
European citizen to believe.  However, after
researching the subject, one could not say that this
prediction is very accurate.  Today, as the EU is moving
closer to the dates specified for monetary union by the
Maastricht Treaty, we can clearly see that the EU is
still very far away from accomplishing their vision of
constant economic growth and peace.  Forty-five years
after the birth of the ECSC, the EU has weathered
economic disasters, high unemployment, popular
skepticism, enlargement problems and fiscal
irresponsibility by member states.  However, even with
these numerous problems, the EU member states will
attain their goal of European Monetary Union (EMU)
which will eventually include additional Eastern
European states.
To first analyze the future of the EU, the single
currency, and enlargement, we must look at the theories
of optimal currency areas developed by Robert
Mundell and Ronald McKinnon.  The theory of
optimal currency areas describes whether a group of
territories are suitable to share a single currency,
whether that group be a federation like the United
States or independent nations such as in the EU.  By
analyzing the monetary units size and makeup, these
two economists developed two nearly opposite theories
to prescribe the best possible area for a single currency.
Mundell believes that a monetary union should
not be so big that it cannot have a common economic
base throughout.  This theory follows the idea that if a
region were too big and had greatly varying industries,
one area could be experiencing an economic boom
while another may be in a recession.  In such a
situation, the monetary unions central bank would
have great difficulty trying to devise a single monetary
policy that would benefit the entire region.  An EU
example of this would be if the UK was experiencing
an economic boom due to an increased demand for
steel and coal while Germany was experiencing a
recession due to a sharp increase in Albanian refugees
coupled with a taste shift from German to Japanese
automobiles.  The European Central Bank (ECB)
would not be able to raise interest rates to avoid
inflation (resulting from the UKs boom) because that
would only augment the economic problems in
Germany, nor could they lower interest rates to help
Germany for the opposite reason.
This problem does not mean that an economic
union as large as the proposed EMU with its widely
varying industries cannot survive, however.  The US
economic union does not shut down every time there
is a recession in New England and a boom in the Pacific
Northwest.  For a region such as the proposed EU to
run efficiently, it needs internal adjustment
mechanisms to compensate for the varying economic
shocks it will experience.
One of the necessary adjustment mechanisms
is ease of labor mobility.  If a resident in Missouri
loses her job as a defense contractor, she should be
able to move to another area of the economic union to
get a similar job with a minimum of obstacles, such as
having to change citizenship.  This free flow of labor
would result in an outflow of labor from the area that
is losing jobs and an inflow to the area that is offering
new jobs, providing a way of balancing out varying
economic shocks within an economic union.
Today, the EU does not offer the same level of
labor mobility that is found in the US.  For starters,
there are ten different official languages within the EU.
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A doctor in Missouri could move over 1500 miles
away and still not have to worry about learning a new
language, yet a doctor in France would have to learn
German if he moved just 100 miles to work in
Germany.  This would then lead to other cultural
barriers that inhibit labor mobility.  No matter where
you are from and want to go in America, cultural
differences would not be as varied compared to say,
Greece and Finland.
Also, there are strong professional boundaries
towards a freer flow of labor in the EU.  Although
similar circumstances do exist within the US, an
accountant that received his
diploma in Wisconsin is able to
work in Illinois.  However,
even though the EU is a
common market, their
accounting system varies from
member to member.  While the
EU is striving towards common
standards for such professions
as accounting, many guidelines
will still be decided by local
guidance, meaning that
internal differences will still
exist (Gallagher and Andrew
57-58).  These professional and
cultural boundaries could
seriously restrict the free flow of labor needed to make
the EU more efficient and to minimize regional
inequalities.
Another necessary internal adjustment
mechanism within the frame of Mundells model is
centralized fiscal transfers.  If Italy is experiencing a
recession while France has a booming economy, labor
mobility may not be sufficiently quick or large enough
to cause an equilibrium in the region.  Centralized
fiscal transfers would then aid the poorer region by
using some of the increased tax revenues from France
and apply them towards projects such as welfare for
Italy.
Once again, however, the structure in place
for this internal adjustment mechanism is not as strong
as its US counterpart.  Called cohesion funds in the
EU, they are not as large as those in the U.S. federal
fiscal system (Caves et al. 604).  Even though no
plans for increasing these funds exist, these cohesion
funds should be augmented in the future to help the
EU run more efficiently, especially considering that
the EU heads have a lot more control over fiscal
transfers than they do labor mobility.
McKinnons theory of optimum currency areas
is quite different from Mundells.  Whereas Mundells
motto might have been go small, McKinnons ideal
optimum currency area would have to be big to protect
its standard of living.  He believed that if the industrial
base of an economic union were too small, that area
would have to import too much, meaning that their
purchasing power for most necessities would rely
greatly on how much the value of their currency
fluctuates in relation to their
trading partners.
For example, say St. Louis
was an economic union with its
own currency.  Domestically,
they produce military aircraft,
beer, and miscellaneous
machine equipment for
industrial plants.  Within a
reasonable range, fluctuations
of the value of St. Louis
currency would not have a very
large impact on the price of its
domestic products.  However,
if the St. Louis currency was
fluctuating wildly with the
central Illinois currency where they bought all of their
corn and milk, consumers would witness their
purchasing power fluctuate every time they got paid.
Such price level instability might result in a loss of
confidence regarding the St. Louis dollar, which could
lead to it losing its function as a stable store of value
(Dunn and Ingram 523).  In this example, there would
be a clear advantage in having an economic union large
enough to produce most of its own goods that it uses.
So which theory is the right one?  Obviously
the EU cannot be big enough to produce nearly
everything it would need while simultaneously being
small enough to ensure optimum labor mobility.  And
there may even be debate over which option is more
desirable within the EU power structure itself.
Germany has made their case repeatedly for strict
adherence to the Maastricht convergence criteria while
making, no secret of their desire for a small euro
(EMU) in the first instance (Peet 7).  Meanwhile,
smaller EMU members such as Portugal are eager
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exploit the trade and price level advantages of
belonging to a full fifteen member EU (Portugal 1997).
So which vision is right for the EU?  This
question is hard enough if we were only looking at the
situation economically, but the EU is a unique case.
Politically, the right EU is a large, inclusive EU.  As I
have already mentioned, the ECSC was the forefather
of the EU, being the first multi-state European
organization to use a federal governing body (the
ECSC High Authority) which was composed of
representatives from the member
countries (France, West
Germany, Italy, Belgium,
Netherlands, and Luxembourg).
Although one of the goals
associated with the creation of the
ECSC was more efficient trade,
President Jean Monet and French
Foreign Minister Robert
Schumans long term goal was to
create a structure that uses
economic integration to
eventually accomplish the
political unification of Europe
(European Community: 95,
1997).  Freer trade was a plus, but
European leaders were also trying
to prevent Germany and France from igniting another
world war.  Therefore, the EU has always had the two
clear goals: increasing the standard of living through
freer trade and forcing member states to be peaceful
with one another due to economic integration.
To improve Europe as a whole, however, the
EU needs to grow so it can be more representative,
more accurately European.  In its history, the EU
has grown from six members to fifteen, enlarging on
four separate occasions.  This enlargement has been
difficult, usually resulting in long negotiations and
bitter debates over the EUs role.  The UK had to wait
over ten years to join the EU because of various
disagreements over the validity of agreements, such
as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which was
advantageous for France but increased the average
British grocery bill.  Disagreements over this policy
led to the vetoing of Britains EU application by
President de Gaulle of France in 1963 and the ceasing
of renewed negotiations in 1967 (History of UK
Membership of the EU, 1997).  However, the recent
accession negotiations for Finland, Austria, and
Sweden only took sixteen months and, unlike previous
enlargements, there were no transitional periods.  The
EU officially views enlargement as, an investment in
our own future, removing trade barriers which
therefore creates wealth and jobs (Brittan 1997).
It is, however, much easier for the EU to accept
wealthy, highly developed nations such as Finland and
Austria than it is to accept poor, former soviet satellites
such as Poland or Hungary.  For example, the three
recent EU additions had either
belonged to, or been associated
with, EFTA  (European Free
Trade Association) since 1960;
and all had developed
progressively closer relations
with the EU over many years
(Brittan 1997).  In contrast, many
eastern European nations are just
now beginning to adjust to free-
market capitalism, an idea that in
some regions is still very new and
foreign.  To add to the difficulties
incurred by eastern European
nations who seek membership in
the EU, there are strict Maastricht
criteria for EMU, which seem
barely attainable to many current EU members and
impossible to non-members.
Also, as witnessed by the recent civil wars in
the former Yugoslavia and Albania, the EU is not
delivering on its original vision of uniting Europe
politically through economic integration.  Traditional
enemies, such as Germany and France may now be
friends, but Baltic nations like Serbia, the powder keg
for W.W.I, are reliving the same wars they participated
in over a century ago.  EU leaders will need to consider
making enlargement a chief priority to ever fully
realize the political potential of an economically
unified, truly European union.
Finally, the last topic discussed here will be
the viability of an EU composed of full-fledged EMU
members or ins and non-euro using outs.  Clearly,
if EMU is to proceed according to the benchmark dates
established by the Maastricht Treaty, some current EU
members will be left out of the first wave of EMU
acceptance (Brittan 1997).  This inequality may foster
an environment within the two-tiered EU that would
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produce two problems: competitive devaluations
between ins and outs and increased speculative
attacks on outs.
It has already been stated that being a member
of the EU certainly has its advantages.  However, many
out members may feel that they are at a disadvantage
compared to the EMUs trading strength, which could
possibly be hurting out industries.  In an effort to
achieve an economic advantage, an out country may
decrease the value of its currency against the euro even
though its inflation is no higher than that of the EMU,
resulting in a competitive devaluation.  These actions
would hurt in industries because it would make their
goods more expensive relative to the goods of the
country that devalued.
The other problem facing outs in a two-tiered
EU world is speculative attacks.  Although speculative
attacks already occur to EU members, the creation of
the EMU will cause new reasons for them to occur.
For example, even after all of the economic and
political sacrifices that have been made by an EU
member, failure to attain EMU status on 1 January
1999 may cause the financial market to believe that
all outs will lose their monetary discipline.  For
example, these out nations may believe that since
they dont have to worry about joining the EU for a
while, they can run a bigger deficit to stimulate growth
and be more politically popular.  Just the possibility
of this occurrence could launch a speculative attack
on any out country, which would be worsened by
the fact that the ECB has vowed not to bail out any
those countries.  These problems may introduce some
added volatility to the future EU.
When analyzing the EUs position as an
optimal currency area, it is important to remember that
no one area is ever going to fit both theories exactly.
No economic union in the world is small enough to
have perfect labor mobility coupled with ability to
produce most of its own products.  It is, therefore,
important to look at the EU as a unique case,
examining how well it fits the theories and what policy
changes are planned.
To analyze the EU from McKinnons
perspective, it would make a great optimal currency
area.  The members of this large economic union
already receive most of their goods from each other.
Even from Mundells perspective, economic unity is
still a possibility.  Labor mobility may look difficult
today, but it is important to remember that
economically integrated international blocs are fairly
new.  This new climate may cause many Europeans
to learn skills that would be valuable all over the
continent and most Europeans already know more than
one language.  If EU officials enact more laws to
promote mobility while also increasing fiscal transfers
amongst members, the economic union as a whole
could adjust efficiently enough to minimize certain
asymmetric economic shocks.
Next there is the question of enlargement.  In
a 1996 speech by Sir Leon Brittan, the vice-president
of the European Commission, he referred to
enlargement as the moral responsibility which history
has challenged us to accept.  Officially, the EU wants
to be as Enlargement-friendly as possible, viewing
Maastricht convergence criteria as sound policies that
should be aspired to, rather than hurdles which they
have to jump (Brittan 1997).  EU leaders realize the
necessity to enlarge eventually, and there is no reason
to doubt that they will continue to admit qualified
nations well into the next century.
Finally, once again we look at the problems
associated with a two-tiered EU.  As far as possible
competitive devaluations taken by outs against the
EMU, there are deterrents already planned for such
actions.  For example, if a country participates in such
devaluation, they would receive EU aid in the form of
their native currency, which would be worth less due
to the devaluation.  Also, as nations negotiated to
become part of the EU, the all signed up to the broad
economic guidelines, which will ensure that we are
all pursuing the same complementary macroeconomic
policies (Brittan).  Regarding speculative attacks, if
an out shows that they are rejecting the EMU and
might participate in competitive devaluations, they will
be ripe for such an attack.  In order to defend
themselves, an out will have to continue to run a
sound monetary policy, defending its currency behind
the strength of the euro.
Today, the question is not whether the
European Union will use a single currency. Rather, it
is who will be the first to participate, and where will it
go, and when will others join.  Although the process
of European economic integration has lasted over forty
years, it still has plenty of room to grow and change.
Adjustments to the union will need to be made
constantly, striving to maintain peace while steadily
Purl
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increasing the standard of living.
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